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‘The most democratic exhibition ever held in this country.’ This was how Jasia
Reichardt, then Assistant Director of the Institute of Contemporary Arts in London,
introduced Play Orbit (plate 1), an exhibition of ‘toys, games, and playables [produced]
by people who are not professionally involved with the design of playthings, but who
work in the field of the visual arts’.1 Play Orbit was curated by Reichardt in collaboration
with Peter Jones of the Welsh Arts Council and first shown at the Royal National
Eisteddfod of Wales in Flint from 4 to 9 August 1969 and then at Nash House, London,
home of the ICA, from 28 November 1969 to 15 February 1970. Its democratic
credentials derived, Reichardt believed, from its open invitation for submissions,
without jury selection (the submissions were limited only by a maximum size of six
feet in any direction) which encouraged students and early-career or marginal artists.
Furthermore, many of its playthings required visitors to the exhibition to engage with
them directly, to build, shake, twist, balance, roll, spin, sort, and so on. Such ludic
explorations were hitherto excluded from the space of public exhibition, and to now
encourage them was, in Reichardt’s view, a democratic gain.
This claim notwithstanding, Play Orbit’s introduction of play participation into
the space of art exhibition certainly changed the nature of the works available to
the public, a change, that is, in what type of thing the work of art was or could be
and what manner of engagement it required as a result. This ontology privileged
performance over representation, as, in most cases, a player was to learn what a toy
did, rather than, say, what it stood for.
The argument that I wish to develop here is that the ontology introduced by Play
Orbit’s toys, games and playables was a cybernetic one. Many of them were, to use an
engineering term central to cybernetics, Black Boxes, each a system of variables with
which one might play without full knowledge of its internal mechanisms and which
might behave in an unpredictable manner as a result. The details of this ontology, and
its significance to an analysis of Play Orbit, will be discussed below. If my argument
stands, what was at the time an unprecedented exhibition of toys, games and
playables actually marks a significant moment in the history of systems art, which
grew through the artistic encounter with cybernetics in the late 1960s and at the
forefront of which was the earlier and better-known exhibition, Cybernetic Serendipity,
also curated by Reichardt at the ICA from 2 August to 20 October 1968. In fact, aside
from obvious differences in content – an exhibition of toys, on the one hand, and an
exhibition of computers and machines, on the other – Play Orbit and Cybernetic Serendipity
appear to share this cybernetic ontology. Most importantly, the later exhibition
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expanded this ontology to the social domain of play, beyond cybernetics’ initial
applications in engineering, computing, and psychiatry, applications that the earlier
exhibition confirmed without question. In doing so, Play Orbit both works through
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1 Jean-Ignace Gérard dit
Grandville, illustration from
Un Autre Monde, Fournier,
Paris, 1844, published in
England as a Christmas
card by Gaberbocchus
Press. Jasia Reichardt and
Peter Jones, Play Orbit,
exhibition catalogue, Studio
International, special issue,
1969/70, front and back
covers.
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the social implications of cybernetics and challenges the idealization of play in postwar British culture as a humanist corrective to a cybernetics-driven technocracy.
Yet, although the impact of cybernetics upon cultural practice at this time has now
become the object of scholarly interest, little attention has been given to its social
dimension in general and to the importance of play and participation in particular.2
The Exhibition

Play Orbit belongs to a small but art-historically significant group of exhibitions of the
late 1960s that invited visitors to engage in what Reichardt called, in her introduction
to the exhibition catalogue, ‘play participation’ (8). Despite the occasional mayhem
and destruction that resulted from the introduction of play to the spaces of public
arts exhibition at that time, for many play offered the ideal means to explore and
intensely experience then current transformations in the exhibition environment
and its contents.3 In Reichardt’s view, developments in ‘a narrow periphery of
painting, sculpture, and other activities developed from, or associated with them’
made an exhibition such as Play Orbit possible (7).4 The initial idea for an exhibition of
toys derived from American curator and critic Gene Baro, who believed the subject of
play would appeal to artists who had abandoned traditional media (7).
As it turned out, in most cases the puzzles, games, and toys on display were
only tenuously connected to developments in painting and sculpture, and Reichardt
herself was reluctant to describe them as works of art at all, even as some were still
isolated and protected in the manner of museum artefacts. Her ambition for the
exhibition was to collapse the false distinction between works of art and ‘those
other things which fill our environment, fulfil our spiritual needs, and which, for
arbitrary reasons, don’t have such elevated titles’ (7). An exhibition of this sort was,
for Reichardt, ‘more significant and interesting as a sociological phenomenon than
a homogeneous aesthetic one’ (7), which is to say that it was significant for the
sociability encouraged by the toys.5 Some failed on this account. The criterion of
playability appeared as strict and demanding as more conventional artistic criteria.
Many of those who initially agreed to contribute later withdrew from the exhibition,
Reichardt wrote, ‘stating frankly that their ideas were not good enough’ (8). Those
who did exhibit displayed, as Jonathan Benthall observed in his review of the
exhibition, ‘a rather unusual humility. ... Children do inspire humility.’6
Reichardt asked contributors ‘What is a Toy?’ On the basis of their answers, she
identified four categories. The first of these was that a toy ‘must involve participation
in its construction’. The second category was that a toy is pleasurable and a
‘depository for the imagination’. Third, a toy is a manipulable environment. Fourth, a
toy is an object ‘with which we can simulate real-life situations’ (8). These categories
covered submissions to the exhibition that ranged from the frivolous to the occult
to the pedagogical, and included praxinoscopes, building blocks, modified chess
games, generic play objects, puzzles and mazes, puppets, and kinetic toys. Many
contributors exploited a toy’s capacity for vast combinatory possibilities, such as Peter
Hobbs’ Multiple No.3, a three-part construction that, according to the artist, offered
‘46,656,000 compositions’.7 Similarly, Roy Grayson’s System – A Postal Toy for Executives
consisted of a kit of twelve cut-out mail order systems that could be assembled as
‘part of a number of interchangeable and variable images which are displayed in a
Perspex case’, and there was Jasper Sewett’s Jigsaw Puzzle with ‘twenty-five symmetrical
double-sided interlocking pieces [that] can be arranged in over 12,000,000 ways’.8
Some contributions made explicit the correspondence between a toy and recent
developments in artistic production. Bernard Bertschinger described his Topless Boxes
347
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2 Bernard Bertschinger,
Topless Boxes, 1969. Seven
wooden boxes, from 60 ×
46 × 23 cm to 30 × 22 × 15 cm.
Photos: Don Flowerdew.
Jasia Reichardt and
Peter Jones, Play Orbit,
exhibition catalogue, Studio
International, special issue,
1969/70, 111.

(plate 2) as a ‘do-it-yourself-multiple-minimal-art-play-kit’, and thereby aligned it
with the use of ‘sets, series, modules, permutations, or other simple systems’ that,
for Robert Morris, characterized minimalist sculptural construction.9 The crucial
additions made by Bertschinger are, quite clearly, a do-it-yourself approach and
play (and in doing so he predates by over a year Morris’s own working through
of the consequences of minimalist sculpture toward play and participation in his
retrospective at the Tate Gallery in 1971). Elaborating upon a quite different set of
artistic strategies from Dada wordplay to concrete poetry, Edwina Leapman’s Proverbial
Disc was, ‘a rotating disc with a flat ring each containing halves of seventy-two proverbs
which can be associated at random’.10 Consistent with the first category, many toys,
such as Topless Boxes and Jigsaw Puzzle, required further construction by participants.
Others belonged to the third category, like Ron Dutton’s Elasticlimb (plate 3). Evidently,
toys in these categories belonged also to the second, as they appeared to be the most
popular, especially with children.
© Association for Art History 2017
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The ICA encouraged participation wherever possible. In an undated letter sent
prior to the opening of Play Orbit, Juliet Brightmore reminded contributing artists
that the Institute was anxious that their toys ‘should be played with and touched,
rather than only looked at’. Some might be damaged as a result, she warned, therefore
each contributor was given the option to recommend his or her toy for one of three
sections according to its robustness. In the first, ‘Museum Section’, exhibits were
‘either fragile or very small’ and would not be touched. The second, B Section was ‘a
gaming area where older children and adults can play with puzzles and construction
games, with a croupier in attendance’. The final, C Section was ‘a participation area
where visitors will be invited to play with the toys and games’.11 Concurrent with Play
Orbit at the ICA, but not at the Eisteddfod, there were a number of plays provided for
and sometimes involving children, as well as puppet shows such as Barry Smith’s
Theatre of Puppets which ran a twice-daily programme from 20 to 24 January 1970 in the
ICA exhibition space.12

3 Ron Dutton, Elasticlimb,
1969. Steel and rubber
climbing frame, 183 ×
183 × 183 cm. Photo: Don
Flowerdew. Jasia Reichardt
and Peter Jones, Play Orbit,
exhibition catalogue, Studio
International, special issue,
1969/70, 114.
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L’esprit cybernétique

As noted above, Play Orbit’s introduction of play participation within a public art
exhibition correlated to a change in what type of thing the work was or could be
and what manner of engagement it required as a result. The ontology of works in
Play Orbit was one that privileged performance over representation, or what things
do over what they might stand for. After all, the toys and playables were primarily
of interest in play, where, through manipulation and feedback, players learnt what
a toy did and what they could do with it. Taking its cue from Andrew Pickering’s
monograph The Cybernetic Brain: Sketches of Another Future from 2010, the principal claim
of this essay is that the ontology of Play Orbit’s toys was a cybernetic one.13 As noted,
this would mean that Play Orbit follows on from Cybernetic Serendipity. The latter sought
‘connexions between creativity and technology (and cybernetics in particular)’,
whereas Play Orbit tested what a toy might be by much less technologically
sophisticated means and was not related explicitly to the field of cybernetics.14
Nonetheless, the two exhibitions shared a participatory and ludic mode of address
to their visitors. As Maria Fernandez argues, both ‘encouraged visitors to interact
with nonhuman entities (objects and machines) and interrogated the boundaries
between pleasure and play’.15 Judged by media reaction at the time, the principal
achievement of Cybernetic Serendipity was to show that visitors could interact with
computers and machines through play. Leslie Stack of the ICA proclaimed that
‘We want people to lose their fear of computers by playing with them and asking
them simple questions.’16 Both operated in an exhibitionary mode consistent with
Reichardt’s demonstrated and longstanding interest in the encounter between
cybernetics and art, a mode in which play organizes an interactive, self-regulating
relationship between an assembly (which might be a computer or a toy) and its
observers.
However, Reichardt has cast doubt upon any connection between the two
exhibitions, meaning that the extent to which cybernetics influenced her curatorial
commitments and decision-making beyond her longstanding interest in computing
and information technologies remains unclear.17 Yet the meeting of cybernetics
and art at the time had prompted what Roy Ascott called, in a two-part essay
published in 1966 and 1967, ‘creative participation’ and ‘decision-making play’.18 The
interdisciplinary and integrative character of cybernetics allowed a ‘cybernetic vision
in art’, or ‘esprit cybernétique’, to extend beyond a mere set of technical procedures or
devices to become a ‘fundamental attitude toward events and human relationships’.19
Cybernetics promised to be a lingua franca applicable across diverse cultural
phenomena in addition to its original application in engineering, computing, and
psychiatry. For Ascott, this spirit was only the most recent instance of a more general
tendency in modern art to move from the production of objects to the elaboration of
‘a field of behaviour’, which in turn led a spectator to become a participant as he or
she was drawn into a feedback loop.20 Entry into this field required ‘decision-making
play’. (Strangely, despite proclaiming himself to be ‘the artist responsible for first
introducing cybernetic theory into art education and for having disseminated the
concept of a cybernetic vision in art’, Ascott was not invited to contribute to Cybernetic
Serendipity. In early October 1968 Ascott had provisionally agreed to participate in 100
Toys, although he then made no contribution to Play Orbit itself.21)
Ascott was not alone in this view. Psychologist Michael Apter, writing in 1969,
declared cybernetics to be ‘a development in science which holds out the promise of
taking art seriously’, just as artistic activity also appeared to offer an opportunity to
manage and model cybernetic apparatuses and complex systems.22 The rapprochement
© Association for Art History 2017
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between art and cybernetics had come about not least because the latter was a means
to describe process and transformation at precisely the time that art had become
process-oriented and open to participation. For Reichardt, too, cybernetic devices
would fully realize the potential of such developments as kinetic art, which, although
promising much, too often had made the dynamic organization of the work inversely
proportional to spectator involvement. ‘It is with the advent of cybernetic machines’,
she declared in 1967, ‘that the sort of dialogue between object and spectator that
kinetic art so far tentatively proposes, can become a functioning reality.’23
More generally, cybernetics was of interest to artists, Apter suggested,
because it offered a ground upon which science and art could meet and
because ‘in some obscure way [it] points to the world of the future’.24 Early in
the conception of Cybernetic Serendipity, Reichardt stated that cybernetics would
allow ‘the industrial process [to be seen] in light of creative activity’, and that
by ‘placing people, ideas, and things in what appears to be an out-of-context
situation ... new possibilities will undoubtedly emerge’.25 Apter praised Cybernetic
Serendipity as ‘a high point in the development of a self-consciously cybernetic art’
and gave some indication of what these new possibilities would be.26 Especially
important was the convergence evident between artistic process and the
cybernetics of open, adaptable systems that included feedback and participation,
and which led to ‘the blurring of some of the traditional distinctions between the
work of art and the system which creates the work of art, and between the work
of art and the system which observes the work of art’.27
In many of her statements, Reichardt seems motivated by this same esprit. In her
book The Computer in Art, published in 1971, Reichardt quotes approvingly from Apter’s
essay: ‘Cybernetics, in its quest to understand complex human behaviour may be
able to throw light in due course on that highly complex type of behaviour called
“artistic” – a type of behaviour clearly involving control and communication.’28 She
notes, again following Apter, that the cybernetic notion of feedback, in particular,
‘has entered the world of happenings as well as various environmental constructions,
where audience participation and reaction can alter the appearance and even the
content of the work in due course’.29 (In fact, the ‘world of happenings’ had done a
great deal to introduce cybernetic ideas into art practice in the late 1950s, to the point
that the Black Box became what Judith Rodenbeck calls a ‘contemporary imaginative
motif’ for the transition from form to process in post-war art in the US. This motif
brought cybernetics together with proto-minimalist sculpture, avant-garde theatre,
and a behaviourist approach that denied any significance to interiority in the
production and interpretation of art. More on Black Boxes below.)30 Indicating the
broad application of cybernetics and continuity in her own interests, Reichardt notes
that the subject of her book, ‘computer-generated graphics as an art medium’, cannot
be understood without mention also of ‘environmental art, cybernetic systems and
audience participation’. Many of the works that result ‘have no significant aesthetic
value’ but are ‘do-it-yourself platform[s] [which have an] important sociological
implication’, because, again, they model complex social behaviour.31 Is this influence
reciprocal? Might other exhibitions that organize complex social behaviour also
be understood in view of cybernetics? Reichardt stated that Play Orbit’s significance,
too, was sociological more than aesthetic. Many of the toys required feedback and
spectator participation and could be described as do-it-yourself platforms. It is
reasonable to suppose that, bookended as it was by Cybernetic Serendipity and Reichardt’s
further reflections on computer-generated art, Play Orbit continues the cybernetic
investigation of complex social behaviour, on this occasion in the domain of play.
© Association for Art History 2017
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Yet Reichardt’s doubt remains, which poses a problem of intention, of
the purposefulness or ‘forward-leaning look’, to borrow Michael Baxandall’s
phrase, of an exhibition such as Play Orbit.32 Reichardt’s intentions for Play Orbit
were comparable to those for Cybernetic Serendipity. First, both proposed play
participation as the ideal mode of visitor engagement; second, they sought to
collapse professional distinctions between artists and non-artists and institutional
distinctions between works of art and other artefacts; and third, they sought to
present the exhibition as an arena in which art and science meet. Reichardt’s
own view was that an experimental work of art should be tested on the public
‘in a scientific manner’. These intentions follow from Reichardt’s personal
interests and commitments as critic and curator as she responds to then current
developments in artistic production and display. Where Reichardt casts doubt
upon the connection between these two exhibitions we might attribute intention
less to her as an individual curator and more to the exhibition in selective relation
to its circumstances. These circumstances might be viewed as a brief to which an
exhibition responds and against which it might be evaluated.
For both exhibitions, I would argue, intention was shaped by this cybernetic
spirit. At stake in this reconstruction of the intention of Play Orbit is, therefore, an
understanding of the impact of cybernetics upon artistic production and display
during this period. Ordinarily, the narrative of post-war British culture has promoted
play and participation as a humanist corrective to a technocratic and automated
society controlled by cybernetic means. Play Orbit, in particular, collapses, or at
least complicates, this opposition by expanding cybernetics to the social domain.
It thereby aligns with what Bruce Clarke has called a ‘systems counterculture’,
active from the late 1960s through the 1970s, especially in the US, which sought
to investigate cybernetic ideas and practices beyond their technocratic application
and to detoxify ‘the notion of “system” of its military, industrial, and corporate
connotations of command and control and [redeploy] it in the pursuit of holistic
ideals and ecological values’.33
Play Participation

The first element of the brief was that an exhibition facilitates participation.
A toy offers an ideal means to achieve this because of the obvious fact that it
requires play. A review of Play Orbit by Alastair Best, published in the journal Design
in 1969, articulates this clearly. Best contends that what mattered most was ‘the
attitude to play rather than the plaything itself’. The participatory works in B and
C sections were most successful in this regard: ‘Some of the best toys are purely
constructional (the participation element) and need no accompanying treatise from
their creators.’34 The ‘participation element’ promised a more direct engagement
with materials, structures, and processes, without the need for institutional
mediation. Pathé footage of the exhibition shows children of various ages
engaging with toys often without adult supervision or, it appears, without prior
explanation.35 In B Section, toys such as Islwyn Watkins’ Hinged Toy Number 1 (plate 4),
a serpentine articulation of twenty-six painted five-centimetre wooden cubes,
Robert Johnson’s Multicube, a set of patterned twenty-three-centimetre cubes which
served as an ‘image kit’, Billie Old’s Pentominoes, a set of wooden building blocks,
and Richard Horden’s Multiple Construction, consisting of 200 identical units that
could tessellate in various ways, all appear to have been ‘purely constructional’,
and thereby to have successfully prompted the attitude to play. The footage also
shows C Section, where by far the most popular among the toys and environments
© Association for Art History 2017
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4 Film still from footage
of Play Orbit exhibition,
showing children playing with
Islwyn Watkins, Hinged Toy
Number 1, 1969. Twenty-six
painted and varnished hinged
wooden blocks, each 5 × 5 × 5
cm. Pathé 3328.05.
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appears to have been Dutton’s Elasticlimb and the Rotating Land/Water Toy and EccentricMovement Activity Toy supplied by Foundation Year students at Guildford School of
Art (plate 5). These are toys that require physical involvement, often of the entire
body, and some degree of collaboration between players. Writing of the toys from
Guildford, Ian Hunter, Head of the Department of Foundation Studies at the School,
notes that ‘Particular emphasis was placed upon the need to engage the child’s, or
parent’s, participation in the use of the toy in a physical way. The scale of the toys
is a direct result of this requirement.’36 Dutton, in a more enigmatic statement,
alludes to the mastery participants might gain: ‘A toy is a situation which enables
the participator/operator to grasp hold of a mental/physical state, which makes
him larger than life.’37
A number of exhibitions at the time promoted participation, if not play itself.
The title of Best’s review, ‘When Attitudes Become Toys’ (which also prompts the
title for this essay), mimics that of the exhibition Live In Your Head: When Attitudes Become
Form, curated by Harald Szeemann and shown at the Kunsthalle Bern from 22 March
to 27 April 1969. Live In Your Head assembled works that exemplified postformalist and
conceptualist tendencies towards serial or modular construction, whose makers
had abandoned objects in favour of open processes. In his introduction to the
exhibition catalogue, Szeemann wrote that ‘The major characteristic of today’s art
353
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5 Guildford School of
Art (Calvin Lucas, Philip
Gregory, Kenneth Ansell),
Rotating Land/Water Toy,
1969. Painted plywood, 127
× 76 cm. Guildford School of
Art (Raymond Duns, Janine
Cairns, Tom Saddington),
Eccentric-Movement Activity
Toy, 1969. Blockboard and
PVC with polyurethane
foam, icosahedron with 61
cm edge. Guildford School of
Art (Joyce Blackley), Circular
Capsule, 1969. Blockboard
and polythene, 91 cm
diameter. Jasia Reichardt
and Peter Jones, Play Orbit,
exhibition catalogue, Studio
International, special issue,
1969/70, 156.

is no longer the articulation of space but of human activity [die Tätigkeit des Menschen],
with the artist’s activity being the principal theme and meaning.’38 Live In Your Head
has now become canonized as, in the words of Germano Celant, who restaged the
exhibition in the Ca’ Corner della Regina, Venice, from June to November 2013,
‘an emblematic and mythical manifestation of a visual and plastic research that had
developed a taste for breaking down the separation between art and life, bringing
into its territory attitudes and materials that were then considered to lie outside its
purview’.39 Following Live In Your Head, Brandon Taylor writes, a number of alternatives
to formalist modernism reconfigured the relationship between the art object, its
setting, and its audience. These included:
‘inexpensive’ attitudes to the gallery as a social space; a marked drop in the
importance of discrimination, fine feeling, empathy, or ‘good taste’; the
generation and deployment of non-aristocratic social networks for artists,
© Association for Art History 2017
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gossip and repute; radical attitudes to mental or physical participation in the
work; the possibility of linkages with wider social and political ideals; and
a new appraisal of what now became widely known as the ‘ontology’ of the
work. ... ‘Participation’ was perhaps the key term.40
Although these alternatives began to emerge prior to Live In Your Head, the exhibition
certainly confirmed their legitimacy for large-scale exhibitions at public institutions.
Play Orbit, too, developed these alternatives. Play participation required evaluative
criteria quite distinct from those of ‘good taste’ or fine feeling and connected with
social networks in which play was idealized. Again, the ontology of the work is at
issue, especially in view of participation. In this latter regard, Play Orbit goes further
than Live In Your Head, where the attitudes in question remained principally those
attributable to the artists involved. With Play Orbit, an artist’s activity enjoyed much
less privilege, making its toys and playables more prosaic, perhaps, but no less
significant as manifestations of visual and plastic research.
Reichardt was dissatisfied with works of art that promoted a participatory mode
of engagement but which failed to achieve it. In March 1968, again writing in Studio
International, Reichardt makes first mention of a proposed exhibition, 100 Toys, in her
essay ‘Non-games’. In response to the ‘information explosion’ brought about by an
increase in communications media and computing, Reichardt notes that a number
of artists have become more esoteric in order to retain the singular value of their
work. She then discusses a number of examples, especially books and games with
which ‘one cannot do anything’.41 Reichardt uses the example of fluxus artist George
Brecht’s Deck of 1966, a pack of fifty-two playing cards without suits or numbers, each
card of which shows a unique pattern, drawing, and diagram. Deck invites a player
to make his or her own rules. However, Reichardt observes, ‘The cards are objects
which invariably are looked at and then put down’ (111). Such a game demonstrates
an ‘attitude’ which is private and nihilistic. Reichardt concludes by stating that such
esoteric works and ‘the phenomenon of easily accessible information’ are ‘irrevocably
interdependent’, but that the former need not result from the latter (111). She then
introduces the exhibition 100 Toys, which implicitly responds to these non-games
through an open invitation to exhibit and through play participation. The test of such
an exhibition would be to produce successful toys, which, in contrast to Brecht’s card
pack, could not be put down.
If participation is viewed as a problem to be resolved, and therefore as part of the
brief of a progressive exhibition such as Play Orbit, there appears no better response
than to encourage play. To do so, however, requires an artist to abandon some of his
or her privileges, whether that be an activity or an attitude. This, at least, was the view
of Reichardt. As a consequence, the second element of the brief was that an exhibition
collapse professional distinctions between artists and non-artists and institutional
distinctions between works of art and other artefacts. The introduction of playability
as a principal criterion of success, which characterizes both Cybernetic Serendipity and
Play Orbit, responds to this. It was, for Reichardt, an attempt to democratize, or at least
popularize, the public exhibition of ‘creative endeavours’.
To Democratize ‘Creative Endeavours’

In June 1968, prior to both of these exhibitions, Reichardt lamented the fact that
the conventional uselessness of art meant that: ‘Many creative endeavours today
are directed solely towards a tiny section of society – one could make it narrower
still by describing it as friends and collaborators.’42 To counter this situation,
© Association for Art History 2017
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Reichardt suggests that an experimental work of art should be tested on the public
‘in a scientific manner’ (290) and refers to Simon Nicholson’s Design 12 course,
established in 1966 at the College of Environmental Design at the University of
California (Berkeley), as an exemplar of this approach. The course demanded every
student product to be ‘self-instructional’ and to be tested on an audience of children.
The products, wrote Reichardt, ‘were to be structures for use by children who, in
the course of coming into contact or playing with them, would learn something
in the process’ (290–91). The games and play objects developed by students on
this course, Nicholson argued, were to simulate ‘the invention, construction, and
testing of a building’ and so emphasized participation, cooperation and assembly.43
Reichardt worried that if Nicholson’s approach was instituted with 100 Toys, ‘the
number of entries would prove rather small ... Even without thinking about a toy
that is self-instructional one wonders (and I have been wondering for some time)
how many of the toys one will actually be able to play with and how many will

6 Simon Nicholson, Magic
Blower, 1969. Wooden box,
motor, glass tube, dimensions
unknown. Jasia Reichardt
and Peter Jones, Play Orbit,
exhibition catalogue, Studio
International, special issue,
1969/70, 136.
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actually work’ (291).
Her concern was largely misplaced. Many of Play Orbit’s toys prompted play,
including Nicholson’s own contribution, a ‘self-instructional sculpture’ called Magic
Blower (plate 6). Named after a smaller prototype that Herbert Read called Magic Wands,
Magic Blower consisted of a long transparent cylinder linked to a switch-operated fan.
Various materials could be placed in the cylinder and blown along it. Participants had
to ‘invent some of its parts’ and could interact with it fully in fun and unexpected
ways.44 It was a ‘high-interaction environment’, Nicholson wrote, ‘with many loose
parts’ or variables with which to play. His ‘theory of loose parts’, developed after Play
Orbit in 1971, stated simply that ‘In any environment, both the degree of inventiveness
and creativity, and the possibility of discovery, are directly proportional to the
number and kind of variables in it.’45 Reflecting upon his Magic Blower, he asks, ‘How
much of a sculpture does the artist invent, and how much does the public invent?’
In answer to his question, Nicholson recounts that ‘Joey Schlenhoff, a young boy
who came to Play Orbit, went back home and invented his own’, although just what
he invented remains a mystery.46 What is clear is that according to the criterion of
playability Magic Blower was demonstrably a success. Art and science ‘exploratoria’
(and with this term, Nicholson gives a nod to Frank Oppenheimer’s playful science
museum, the Exploratorium opened in San Francisco in 1969) such as Play Orbit or the
Robert Morris retrospective at the Tate in 1971 are initial responses to the scant
availability of loose parts in most environments, whether architectural, educational,
cultural, or otherwise, Nicholson claims.47 Such exhibitions might assist a new
generation to ‘invent new systems with the parts’, all of which suggests that, for
Nicholson, and for his supporter, Reichardt, play participation was a means of
systems building and testing made available to a broad audience.48
This was evident with the rather conventional group exhibition, 100 Toys,
with which Reichardt began. In autumn 1968, invitations were sent to a hundred
prominent artists resident in Britain or British artists living abroad to submit any toylike or game-like works of art they might have made but had not exhibited. Despite
this conventional selection process, at this early stage the exhibition itself was already
anticipated to be something of a departure from the norm. The introduction of toys
into the exhibition space required a transformation of its architecture, at least. In a
letter of 26 February 1968 to Francis Hawcroft, Keeper of Whitworth Art Gallery,
Manchester, ICA Director Michael Kustow suggested that 100 Toys might travel north
after its run in London. The toys, he wrote, were to be displayed in ‘an environment
something like a climbing frame, involving swings, see-saws, curly staircases,
and play areas where we asked the Art Colleges to create giant interpretations of
traditional games’. He then enthused: ‘I think it is going to be one [of] our most
exciting exhibitions since Cybernetic Serendipity.’49
Kustow was right to anticipate that Play Orbit would be as exciting, and certainly
as popular as Cybernetic Serendipity. This was largely because both slackened, if not
abandoned professional and disciplinary boundaries between artists and public. With
Cybernetic Serendipity, there was no indication given of the affiliation or profession of
the makers and authors of the different works, in order not to give further support to
what Reichardt called ‘categorical assumptions about our various talents, functions,
and possibilities [that in 1968] are less accurate than ever’.50 After the selection
process for 100 Toys had been abandoned, the open invitation for contributions to Play
Orbit showed a similar disregard for conventional methods of artistic discrimination
and assessment. More so than any other exhibition of that moment, Play Orbit
overcame the prevailing artistic hierarchies of materials, activities, and attitudes in
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both the production and the display of works.
What, in the planning of 100 Toys, led Reichardt to change the exhibition from
invitation to open submission? Reichardt does not disclose why this occurred.
There may have been practical reasons. Certainly, it appears to have been difficult to
find one hundred artists willing or able to contribute toys. By early October 1968,
less than half of those invited had provisionally agreed to take part.51 Judging by
Reichardt’s commitments, as outlined above, perhaps it was also awareness both of
the democratizing consequences of an exhibition of toys, with which visitors would
have to play, after all, and that the inclusion of contributions from art students would
open the door to counter-cultural contestations to traditional methods of artistic
production and display. An open submission would be more in keeping with the
egalitarian demands of these contestations.
This is the suggestion of Michael Punt, a contributor to Play Orbit, who notes
that currents in the art colleges and schools of the time carried over into the
exhibition, where many contributors refused both modernist essentialism and the
patriarchy of canonical continuity. Play participation served as the ideal mode for this
‘counter‑attack’:
[The artists’] provisional, playful and witty responses to the absolutist
assertions and mechanistic models of causality saw the recovery of longforgotten art and ideas from the fringes. By situating this counter-attack in
the discourses of play (with all its dilettante and ephemeral connotations)
they avoided the criticism of merely displacing one order for another.52

7 Flyer for Yoko Ono,
unnamed event, Sunday 4
June 1967 on Parliament Hill,
London. Photo: Courtesy of
Yoko Ono/Galerie Lelong.
Jasia Reichardt, ‘Art is Big,
Round, and Good’, Studio
International, 174: 892,
September 1967.
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Play’s provisional and contingent orders opposed the procedural fixity and
specializations of curricula derived from modernist essentialisms. There were
Play Orbit contributions from both Hornsey College of Art and Guildford School of
Art where, in 1968, well-publicized protests had taken place over curricula and
amenities. However, Punt is too quick to present play as disorder and disruption,
rather than simply another mode of ordered activity, albeit often more open
and flexible than previous modes of art education. In fact, reorganization, not
disorganization, was at stake in many of the art school protests. At Hornsey, the
principal demand was for a ‘network system’, based upon an open and nonspecialized pedagogy, to replace a ‘linear system’ that was oppressive, overspecialized and out of date. The network system would allow skills and disciplines
to correlate according to the aims of particular student projects, would emphasize
process and the unification of art and design, and would produce a ‘flexible training
in generalised creative design, adaptable to changing circumstances’.53 Most
significant here is that the students of Hornsey, aside from their occasional rhetoric
of ‘smash the system’, sought to replace one systemic order with another, more fluid,
adaptable and open to play.
Many alternative arts practices used play as an egalitarian and participatory
means to organize extra-institutional and leisure-based modes of sociability.
Reichardt was aware of this. In 1967 she wrote how leisure and entertainment
activities were increasingly used by the artistic ‘underground’ as a means to develop
forms of ‘total art’. She used the example of Fun Palace, a ‘socially interactive machine’
proposed by Joan Littlewood, Gordon Pask, and Cedric Price in 1962, and which had
its own Cybernetics Subcommittee headed by Pask.54 The architecture of the Palace
aimed to be ‘informal, flexible, unenclosed, and impermanent’, and would allow
both optimum entertainment and the various needs of its inhabitants to be satisfied
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as and when they arose.55 Reichardt described it as ‘a kind of network in which
people’s free time would be manipulated for their own good and delight’.56 Despite
its promise of a cybernetically controlled, adaptive architecture for the purposes of
optimizing leisure time, Reichardt noted that Fun Palace was rejected in discussion
with students of Cardiff College of Art because it appeared too hierarchical and too
reminiscent of a holiday camp.
Yet still, Fun Palace foresaw ‘the merging of the fun fair/amusement complex
with the aspirations towards ideology/avant-garde which activities of young people
manifest today’.57 It promised a ‘combination of creativity, amusement and freedom’
which, for Reichardt, was more fully realized in ‘be-ins’, such as that organized
by Yoko Ono on Sunday 4 June 1967 on Parliament Hill, an area of parkland in the
south-east corner of Hampstead Heath, London (plate 7). Ono’s ‘be-in’ consisted of
kite-flying, dancing, music, and knitting, and lasted for five hours. Reichardt was
most impressed by the organization of the event. ‘Be-ins are above all democratic’,
she wrote, ‘they may look like a substitute for political commitment or some more
demanding occupation with which young people could occupy themselves, but they
are organic, self-regulating and self-supporting.’ As such, they connect to ‘the art of
the future’.58
Although at this stage (September 1967) Reichardt does not propose an exhibition
of toys at the ICA, she demonstrates a clear interest in the democratic possibilities
of sociability through play. These possibilities were already explored through a
counterculture and underground that privileged creativity, amusement and freedom.
Cybernetics itself was enlisted to this end. The Fun Palace, in its attempt to transform
‘unmodified people’ into ‘modified people’ through networked entertainments,
might have discouraged some, but the difference between this and the organic and
self-regulating be-ins is one of degree, not of kind.59 Similarly, if play was a ‘counterattack’, as Punt maintains, it was precisely because it offered to displace one order for
another. The attempt to collapse the professional and institutional distinctions that
make the public arts institution exclusive and remote is a response to this problem of
organization, of how different types of sociability, including leisure activities, might
be organized. In his essay ‘Systems Esthetics’, published in September 1968, critic
and curator Jack Burnham states that ‘the priorities of the present age revolve around
the problems of organization’. To address these problems, Burnham recommends
a ‘systems viewpoint’ that focuses ‘on the creation of stable, on-going relationships
between organic and non-organic systems, be they neighborhoods, industrial
complexes, farms, transportation centers, recreation centers, or any of the other
matrixes of human activity’.60 Although her own ‘systems viewpoint’ is not explicit at
this time, and will become so only in the planning of Cybernetic Serendipity, a year prior
to Burnham’s essay Reichardt identifies play, and its extension into leisure activities,
as just such an organizational problem.
An Adult Play Centre

The ICA identified itself from its beginning as an institution that would foster
play. In 1947, co-founder Herbert Read proposed the ICA as an ‘adult play centre, a
workshop where work is a joy, a source of vitality and a daring experiment’.61 The
following year, Read declared the Institute’s ambition ‘not only to entertain and
educate the general public’ but to bring the public ‘into intimate contact with the
artists, so that a new creative effort may spring from a new sense of communion
or mutual understanding’.62 Play was central to this creative effort because, as
Read wrote in Education Through Art, published in 1943, it was a plastic, largely non© Association for Art History 2017
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visual mode of expression and a rudimentary ‘form of art’. ‘All forms of play’, he
wrote, ‘are so many kinaesthetic attempts at [the] integration’ of fears, wishes, and
fantasies.63 David Thistlewood writes that, from its inception, the ICA’s two most
important educational issues were ‘the analogous relationship between modern
art and modern science and the principle of adopting “primitive” percipience
toward visual and plastic creativity’.64 It is clear that, for Read, play exemplified such
percipience. Many of the contributors to Play Orbit appeared to support this view.
Contributors’ answers to the question ‘What is a Toy?’ frequently include claims
for play as a rudimentary mode of understanding, of how, for example, it ‘excites
the spectator’s interest and curiosity in tactile and visual situations’ or functions as
‘a medium for experiencing touch and control’.65 The curatorial assumption of Play
Orbit, as well as the opinions of many of its contributors, accords with Read’s claim
that play offers a rudimentary form of plastic expression, less specialist and more
participatory than the domain of art.
By 1964, in the short essay ‘Atrophied Muscles and Empty Art’, Read presented
play as a corrective to what a New Statesman editorial of the previous year had called
‘The Terrible Challenge of Leisure’.66 Read deplored the predominance of spectacular
entertainments that encouraged only passive enjoyment and were an unsatisfactory
response to the problem of how to fill time in a society of increasing affluence and
automation. Yet entertainment might become play when it is ‘active, participated in,
[and] practised’.67 In Read’s view, an art that takes play as its mode of production and
exposition might solve the problem of leisure and engage the ‘new creative effort’
that he had called for sixteen years previously.
Reichardt’s interest in the organization of leisure has been noted above. Play Orbit
itself shows sympathy with Read’s concerns in so far as the catalogue republishes the
first and final chapters from Sebastian de Grazia’s Of Time, Work and Leisure, published
in 1962. De Grazia argued for leisure to be realigned with contemplation and
learning rather than with recreation and entertainment. Leisure, now defined in
terms of motivation rather than simply free time, should be expanded beyond a
leisure class that depended upon workers who were then offered compensational
amusements and diversions.68 Such arguments about the character and proper use
of leisure became especially urgent to an increasingly automated post-war society.
Consequently, as Play Orbit contributor John Berry proclaims, the future role of the
artist should be one which supplies ‘some of the leisure activities of a nearly workless
society brought about by the development of automation and robotics’.69 With
Cybernetic Serendipity and then Play Orbit, the self-proclaimed ‘adult play centre’ of the ICA
staked a claim as something of an experiment in ‘motivated’ leisure activity.
An Arena for Art and Science

The first ‘educational issue’ for the ICA, as noted above by Thistlewood, was the
relation between art and science. In his intellectual biography of Read, Thistlewood
stated that the ICA was conceived as an anarchistic social experiment as much as an
exhibition space which sought in art ‘an expression of the scientific Zeitgeist, and
to find respectable common principles – [such as] a theory of organic formation –
in physical science, a science of mind, and an explanation of creativity’.70 Read’s
collaboration with physicist Lancelot Whyte, which led to the exhibition Growth and
Form in 1951, exemplified this ambition, as, too, did the appointment in March 1949
of art historian Josef Paul Hodin as Director of Studies and librarian for the ICA, asked
to study the influence of scientific thought upon developments in contemporary art
and even to advocate the scientific basis of contemporary art. In 1969, polymath and
© Association for Art History 2017

361

When Attitudes Became Toys

theatre director Jonathan Miller was elected to the ICA council and reiterated this
ambition with his promise to ‘bring the arts and sciences into one arena’.71 Clearly,
Cybernetic Serendipity was such an arena, as it provided a situation for viewers to reevaluate preconceptions about professional and disciplinary distinctions and about
the broader social import of cybernetic technologies.72 It is less obvious whether
or not Play Orbit was too. On closer inspection, however, Reichardt’s views on the
playability and testability of Play Orbit’s contents, noted above, appear to betray a
cybernetic approach based upon feedback and decision-making play as a means to
engage with complex systems and Black Boxes.
As Reichardt’s views on participation and testability show, this approach entailed
a distinct understanding of artistic production. A decade earlier, in a lecture given
at the ICA in April 1960, titled ‘Art and Communication Theory’, British psychiatrist
and cybernetician W. Ross Ashby had already discussed this. One advantage of
cybernetics, Ashby claimed, is that it concerns only what is demonstrable and
therefore has ‘exactly nothing to say on this subject of the internal personally felt
aspect of things’.73 In this view, artistic activity is meaningful only according to the
information-theoretical distinction between what was selected and what could have
been but was not. As a result, and most controversially in Ashby’s view, cybernetics
describes such activity in a way that avoids the dichotomy of ‘soullessly mechanical’
or divinely inspired. Instead, it is based upon ‘appropriate selection’, which involves
a great deal of ‘drudgery’ and failed tests. ‘The person that produces some almost
magical artistic creation’, Ashby states, ‘is not doing it in an actual magic way, he [sic]
is following really a perfectly straightforward way that is essentially natural.’ This
natural process is simply one of testing out what can be done and of linking cause
to effect toward a particular goal. It is therefore possible, Ashby concludes, that a
computer, ‘the completely plastic machine’, would be capable of producing art.
In all but name, this is the approach advocated by Reichardt, most concisely
stated in her essay ‘Art and Usefulness’ of June 1968:
Art is an act of transformation which may sometimes appear miraculous
but which does not depend on miracles. When firmly based, it is likely to
produce good test results and then it may be quite safe to leave the usual
accompaniment of metaphysical explanations alone.74
Play participation, too, had no need of metaphysical explanations. Toys could be
tested. Their playability, or lack thereof, could be demonstrated. Yet still, play, like
art, might be an ‘act of transformation’ that emerges at a human/object or human/
machine interface. The egalitarian ambition behind the introduction of playability as
the primary criterion for evaluation of Play Orbit’s toys also brought those toys under a
cybernetic description.
To place toys and play participation under a cybernetic description does not
mean simply that players become subject to technocratic control, as Usselmann
suggests with regard to Cybernetic Serendipity.75 Instead, Play Orbit might display
the ‘progressive posthumanism’ that Fernandez claims for Cybernetic Serendipity.
First formulated by Katherine Hayles in How We Became Posthuman of 1999, this
version of posthumanism, rather than subordinate humans to technocratic
control, emphasizes instead the necessity of embodied and contingent relations
between humans and other agents, which latter might include machines but
also artefacts, assemblages, puzzles, and so on. In this view, subjectivity emerges
from such relations and cannot be separated from them. As Hayles defines it, ‘In
© Association for Art History 2017
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8 Film still from footage of
Play Orbit exhibition, showing
children playing with Alun and
Elizabeth Evans, Structube,
1969. Assembly kit of treated
cardboard tubing and wood,
each unit diameter of 8 cm
and varying lengths from 15 to
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the posthuman, there are no essential differences between bodily existence and
computer simulation, cybernetic mechanism and biological organism, robot
teleology and human goals.’76 The posthuman player is not therefore unfree.
Rather, the prefix ‘post’ identifies the limitations of the model of the liberal
human subject at liberty to assert her will through her own ludic projects. If
one adopts the posthumanist view of a player, however, ‘there is no a priori
way to identify a self-will that can be clearly distinguished from an otherwill’, Hayles writes, which might be other players, of course, but also the rules,
constraints, and materials that are constitutive of play.77 Cybernetic Serendipity was
progressively posthuman because its demands for participation and interaction
took subjectivity to be ‘emergent and contingent’, arrived at and tested out in
play.78 Play Orbit was no different in this regard, as through its games, puzzles, and
playables there emerged the subjectivities and complex social behaviours that had
featured prominently in Cybernetic Serendipity.
Again, What is a Toy?

To summarize the above, Play Orbit’s introduction of play participation into the space
of art exhibition correlated to a change in the ontology of the works available to
the public, a change in what type of thing the work of art was or could be and what
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manner of engagement it required as a result. This ontology privileged performance
over representation. In most cases, a player was to learn what a toy did, rather than,
say, what it stood for. Many of Play Orbit’s toys consisted of ‘loose parts’, or variables
with which to play, and they were to be judged primarily according to the criterion
of playability. Such a toy was cybernetic and would assist a new generation in systems
building and testing.
This cybernetic ontology of toys can be developed further by again posing
Reichardt’s question to Play Orbit’s contributors, ‘What is a toy?’ As discussed above, a
toy necessarily consists of loose parts. Nicholson’s Magic Blower clearly shows this, as
do most of the constructional toys in the exhibition. For example, Alun and Elizabeth
Evans’s Structube, a kit of eight-centimetre cardboard tubing and wooden hinges, could
be assembled to make ‘a great variety of structures, including a rocket, a tent’.79 The
Pathé footage shows three boys building an improvised assembly (plate 8). In such an
instance, a toy, rather than a dumb apparatus discrete from participants, appears to be
the result of co-construction.
Cybernetician Heinz von Foerster, whose work on cognition was central to
developments in what became known as second-order cybernetics, described objects
not as material entities but as ‘tokens’ for stable behaviour in a complex system. The
stability of an object was due to the recursive application of observations to their own
results. To clarify how this is done, in her intellectual biography of von Foerster Lynn
Segal gives the example of a child playing with a ball. She writes, ‘After sufficient
interaction, [the child] begins to experience the ball as an invariant. His recursive
behaviour, operating on the result of his previous operations, reaches stability.’80 This
is how objects must be understood, von Foerster claims, if observers are included in
what they observe or the observer and the object, the plaything, belong to the same
system.81 In play participation, then, a toy is, for its players, a recurrent selection and
a constraint that objects to and restricts behaviour. Out of all that could have been
selected arises the constancy of what von Foerster calls a Gegenstände, an object that
stands against its observer.
Play Orbit contributor Victor Newsome’s fictional account of a young girl playing
with a doll whilst observed by her mother describes just such a complex system.
The unreconstructed gendering of Newsome’s example notwithstanding, this
‘toy situation’ shows clearly how players are entangled in contingent relations to
one another and how the object of play, the doll, stabilizes through their recurrent
observations in play. Only then does the doll become, to return to Reichardt’s fourpart definition of a toy, a ‘depository for the imagination’ and an object ‘with which
we can simulate real-life situations’.82
With constructional toys, too, players must find out what a toy does or
how it will perform as an object that constrains behaviour. They enter into this
performative relation with a toy without the need to understand its ‘internal
mechanisms’, which makes the toy, either in whole or in part, a Black Box.
For Pickering, cybernetics has a Black Box ontology. To explain this ontology,
Pickering takes, from Ashby’s An Introduction to Cybernetics of 1958, the example of a
doorknob.83 A child trying a doorknob learns to match input (her manipulation
of it) to output (release of the latch) without seeing or understanding the
internal mechanism. The doorknob is a Black Box, Ashby writes, ‘whose
internal mechanisms are not fully open to inspection’. The concept of a Black
Box, which arose to describe problems in electrical engineering, extends to
any systemic entity that performs some task by means largely obscure to an
observer. To paraphrase Ashby, when faced with a Black Box, the question ‘What
© Association for Art History 2017
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is in it?’ becomes redundant. Other questions are more pressing, such as ‘How
should an observer proceed?’ ‘Which elements of the Box are discoverable and
which are not?’ ‘What methods can be used to investigate the Box?’ In Ashby’s
view, aside from its infamous, if somewhat overstated, relationship with
systems of technocratic administration and surveillance, the most important
aspect of cybernetics is that it ‘tries to address the problematic of getting along
performatively with systems that can always surprise us’.84 In doing so, an
experimenter couples herself to the Box ‘so that the two form a system with
feedback’ (87). Perhaps the only way to engage the unpredictability of a Black
Box, what mathematician René Thom called its ‘catastrophe’, is to play with it.85
A toy might be an exemplary Black Box. Charles Baudelaire’s essay ‘Morale du
joujou’ (1856), republished in full in the Play Orbit catalogue, suggests how. ‘The child
twists and turns his toy’, Baudelaire writes, ‘scratches it, shakes it, bumps it against
the walls, throws it on the ground’, and in doing so displays a ‘first metaphysical
© Association for Art History 2017
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tendency’. However, when the child at last opens it up and asks herself ‘But where is
the soul?’, so begins ‘stupefaction and sorrow’.86 In order to avoid the onset of these
emotions, the player learns to leave the Black Box closed enough that the system of
Box and player might retain its soul.
For example, in the Pathé footage, two children appear to risk ‘stupefaction and
sorrow’ as they play with Gordon Fletcher’s Wobbler (plate 9), a sphere with ‘black
tentacles’ which wobbled when a trip mechanism was activated. The children
roughly spin Wobbler upon its base so that its two hemispheres begin to separate
(plate 10). They pay no heed to Fletcher’s wish that the trip mechanism would cause
the tentacles to ‘jolt every few minutes’, and obviously have little knowledge of
Wobbler’s internal mechanism.87 Wobbler fails to be ‘self-instructional’, yet still the two
children enter into a performative relation with it and will continue to do so as long
as they do not open it up to discover its ‘soul’.
Wobbler’s treatment shows that, as a toy, the status of the Black Box becomes
particularly precarious and its soul can be placed under stress, if not eradicated. Yet
playing with such Black Boxes also might involve what Reichardt claimed for art:
‘an act of transformation’ that displayed emergent or even ‘miraculous’ properties
without thereby depending on miracles or metaphysical explanations.88 Play Orbit took
on this Black Box ontology with its introduction of toys and its address to members
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of an audience who must now test out what a toy does and what can be done with it
in order to ‘get along’ with the unpredictable systems, the toys and environments, in
which they take part.
Conclusion

There is enough in the historical record to discount Reichardt’s doubts and to identify
Play Orbit as a significant moment in the history of systems art that grew through the
artistic encounter with cybernetics in the late 1960s. Its significance would be that it
expands cybernetics beyond its initial applications in engineering, computing, and
psychiatry, to include the domain of play.
Several cautionary notes have been made in recent scholarship with regard
to emancipatory claims for participation in art during the late 1960s. On the one
hand, Janet Kraynak has shown how between 1969 and 1974 Bruce Nauman built
a number of extended sculptural installations that challenge the predominantly
positive view of participation in the art-historical literature. Either as corrective
to alienation, critique of authorship, or experimentation in collectivity, Kraynak
argues, ‘participation is seen as an interventionist gesture that furthers the
ambitions of a progressive avant-garde’.89 By contrast, Nauman’s installations
presented participation as a strange, dependent, and decidedly not ludic situation.
Drawing on the work of sociologist Alain Touraine, Kraynak suggests that
these works are a response to the emergence of a technocratic society in which
participation is a dominant mode of control and alienation.
On the other hand, even where participation was ludic, and even, on occasion,
chaotic and destructive, as Floe has shown in her study of three events from the
period, there was a ‘persistence of spectatorial norms even in their proclaimed
absence’, and participation was, if not fully controlled, then at least planned and
managed through play.90 Floe criticizes the promotion of play at the time as ‘a lawless
sphere of freedom and authenticity’, and demands a ‘more nuanced understanding of
[play’s] social, contextual, rule-bound and performative aspects’.91
Play Orbit merits neither of these criticisms. In this instance, cybernetics does
not simply apply to technocratic communication and control, built upon ‘efficient
interaction’ and rightly criticized by the likes of Kraynak.92 Nor, as a counter to
technocracy, does Play Orbit idealize play. The performative aspect of play participation
shown by Play Orbit, which Reichardt described, in good faith, as the ‘most democratic
exhibition ever held in this country’, was neither lawlessly free nor technocratic. Its
Black Boxes consisting of many loose parts were played with and tested, and could
be engaged only through a performative relationship between toy and players. This
ontological change allowed Play Orbit to test out modes of sociability, in response to
the problems of organization outlined above. In doing so, it extended cybernetics
into the social fabric, and for this reason should be viewed as a significant moment in
the encounter between art and cybernetics at the very end of the 1960s.
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